The court noted it had not been made aware of any efforts on Pratt's behalf to secure private counsel until this day. Further, the court noted that it had gone through "administrative gymnastics" to schedule the hearing. The requested length of the delay was two weeks. In addition, there was no evidence that Pratt was attempting to manipulate the proceedings; he had not previously requested a continuance, and there were no findings regarding inconvenience to witnesses or prejudice to the prosecution.
Finally, the record is devoid of any specific "irreconcilable conflict" between Pratt and his public defender, and there was no discussion of the public defender's qualifications. From the record, it is clear that the magistrate should have granted Pratt's motion for a continuance. Slappy , U. Sarafite , U. The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to reach a determination of whether "a public offense has been committed and that there is probable or sufficient cause to believe that the defendant committed such offense. O'Mealey , 95 Idaho , , P. It is the state's burden to show that "substantial evidence," and not evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, supports the two-pronged determination.
Owens , Idaho , , P. A magistrate's determination that probable cause exists to bind a defendant over to the district court for trial "should be overturned only on a clear showing that the committing magistrate abused his or her discretion. State , 91 Idaho , P. Where a defendant receives a fair trial, errors connected with the preliminary hearing will afford no basis for disturbing the judgment of conviction.
Mitchell , Idaho , P. Our independent review of the record, and analysis below regarding other issues, leads us to conclude that Pratt did receive a fair trial. Therefore, the magistrate's error in not granting the continuance did not so taint the process as to require reversal. Furthermore, the magistrate properly reviewed the evidence before her, and she found that substantial evidence supported her determination to bind Pratt over to the district court for trial.
Pratt argues that the deceased victim, Brent Jacobson, was not a "peace officer," and that, as such, Pratt could not be convicted of first degree murder as it is defined in I. Pratt contends that Brent Jacobson, who was an officer of the United States Forest Service, was not a "peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, fireman, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney. Peace officers enumerated.
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Neither I. The reason that "peace officer" is defined in this act is because our legislature has determined that only certain enumerated persons can execute an arrest warrant.
Likewise, I. Regardless of the victim's status or occupation as a "peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, fireman, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney," I. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the Pratt brothers were aware that they were being pursued by law enforcement officers. Officer Barbieri testified that immediately prior to the shootout, he told the Pratt brothers to "[h]old it right there," and that Brent Jacobson said "Sheriff's Department.
Don't move. Pratt testified that immediately prior to the shootout he heard someone say "[d]rop your weapons" Tr. Officer Brent Jacobson was clearly acting in the lawful discharge of his official duty, was known to be doing so by Pratt, and, therefore, his death was that of a law enforcement officer under I. Pratt contends that the murder of Brent Jacobson did not occur "in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate" the robbery, burglary, and kidnapping that had occurred earlier at or near the residence of Louise Turner, i.
We have addressed this very argument before. In State v. We held that "Grammer's death was part of a stream of events which began the evening Fetterly and Windsor entered Grammer's home and ended the following day when Grammer's possessions were removed from the home. In the present case, the trial court properly held that Brent Jacobson's death was also part of the stream of events which began when the Pratt brothers entered the residence of Louise Turner for the purpose of stealing money, were suddenly caught in the middle of the act by police officers, took a hostage to facilitate their escape, led the pursuing officers on a car and foot chase, and ended the following day when the Pratts finally surrendered to the pursuing police officers.
Pratt argues that because intent is not an element of felony murder, State v.
Brian Douglas Long, 53
Windsor , Idaho , , P. Furthermore, Pratt argues that since the jury rejected "lying in wait" as a ground for its verdict of murder, the only type of murder he could have been found guilty of committing against Deputy Steve Barbieri, who was present with Brent Jacobson during the fatal shoot-out, was felony murder.
We agree with Pratt. Attempted felony murder is not a crime in Idaho.
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Instead, there is either the crime of murder, or the crime of attempt to commit a crime, in which case the state bears the burden of proving that the defendant intended to commit the crime. From the jury's verdict on Count XVI, we cannot discern which theory the jury agreed upon to convict Pratt of the attempted first degree murder of Deputy Steve Barbieri. The jury could have based its verdict upon Barbieri being a law enforcement officer or upon the attempt occurring during the commission of certain felonies. Since we cannot discern the jury's theory from the record, we vacate Pratt's conviction and sentence for Count XVI of the jury's verdict, regarding attempted first degree murder of Deputy Steve Barbieri.
Pratt attacks the reasonable doubt, good character, and sympathy instruction, Jury Instruction "J. That portion of J. The information in this case is of itself a mere accusation or charge against the defendant, and is not of itself any evidence of the defendant's guilt, and you are not to be prejudiced or influenced to any extent against the defendant because a criminal charge has been made.
The law presumes every person is innocent. This presumption of innocence is not a mere form to be disregarded at pleasure, but it is an essential part of the law, and it is your duty to give the defendant the full benefit of this presumption until the [state] has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To justify a conviction of the defendant, the burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty as charged in the information.
If the evidence fails to so convince you it is your duty to acquit the defendant. You are not at liberty to adopt unreasonable theories or suppositions in considering the evidence in order to justify a verdict of guilty. A reasonable doubt is that state of mind which, after a full consideration of all the evidence both for the State and the defense, leaves your minds in a condition that you do not feel an abiding faith amounting to a moral certainty that the defendant is guilty as charged in the information.
Even where the evidence is so strong that it demonstrates the probability of the guilt of the party accused, still if it fails to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt then you must acquit the defendant. To convict the defendant, the evidence must, to your minds, exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the defendant. If after consideration of all the evidence in the case, you can reasonably explain the facts given in evidence on any reasonable ground other than the guilt of the defendant, you should acquit.
A doubt produced by undue sensibility in the mind of the juror in view of the consequences of a guilty verdict, is not a reasonable doubt, and the jury are not allowed to create sources or materials of doubt by trivial and fanciful suppositions or by remote conjectures as to possible state of facts different from those established by the evidence.
Your oath imposes upon you no obligation to doubt when no doubt would exist if no oath had been administered, and, in consideration of the case, the jury are not to go beyond the evidence to hunt up doubts. A doubt to justify an acquittal must be reasonable.
The law, in order to convict, does not require the guilt of the defendant to be established to an absolute certainty, but it does require guilt to be established to your satisfaction to a moral certainty, and that is a certainty that convinces and directs your understanding and satisfies your reason and judgment of the truth of the charge. If you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
We have explained that the analysis of a constitutional attack on a reasonable doubt jury instruction "must begin with the fundamental principle of criminal law:". Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the accused] is charged.
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Rhoades , Idaho 63, 82 , P. This fundamental principle of criminal law requires that "when a jury is instructed on the reasonable doubt standard, the instruction cannot raise the degree of doubt necessary for an acquittal. Like the appellant in Rhoades , Pratt contends that the reasonable doubt instruction minimizes the state's burden of proof, and he cites Cage v.
Louisiana , U. McGuire , U.
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However, as this Court held in Rhoades , Idaho at 82 , P. Instead, the reasonable doubt jury instruction in this case is "substantially the same" as the instructions given in Rhoades and State v. Cotton , Idaho , , P. Hoffman , Idaho , , P. We cannot say that the instruction misstated the law, or was so confusing and argumentative as to mislead the jury.
Rhoades , Idaho at 83 , P. We also hold that the other jury instructions attacked by Pratt do not misstate the law. Enno , Idaho , , P. Jury Instructions 1, 49, 82, and A correctly state the law.
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We do note, however, that J. The instruction was mere surplusage, and Pratt has shown no prejudice therefrom. In addition, we note that the jury was instructed upon criminal negligence, J. Pratt argues that J. However, the jury was specifically instructed on the elements of each crime charged and was instructed that the state had the burden to prove each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt: J.
Pratt contends that he was convicted and sentenced upon multiple criminal counts in violation of double jeopardy guarantees, citing Idaho's double jeopardy statute, I. The district court entered an order amending Pratt's sentences. In it, the trial court merged his sentences for burglary, Count I, robbery, Count II, and second degree kidnapping, Count III, into his sentence for first degree murder.
Pizzuto , Idaho , , P. Card , Idaho , , P.
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We are not concerned with Count XVI, regarding the attempted first degree murder of Deputy Steve Barbieri, because we have vacated Pratt's conviction for this count in section IV above. On this record, Pratt was not twice placed in jeopardy. Pizzuto , Idaho at , P.
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